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Income volatility is studied as a component of economic insecurity using recent data from the 
Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF).  Techniques from the inequality literature are 
applied to longitudinal household incomes and we refer to the results as measurements of 
income insecurity.  Using this method we examine (i) cross national differences in average 
insecurity levels, (ii) the effects of taxes and transfers on the insecurity of different income 
groups and (iii) the relationships between income insecurity and long-run household income. 
We find that for pre-government incomes Britain exhibits the highest levels of income 
insecurity, with the U.S. the lowest. However estimates of insecurity in post-government 
incomes are highest in the U.S. It is shown that insecurity in market incomes is primarily 
concentrated around low income families and that this pattern is strongest in Germany and 
weakest in the U.S. Insecurity in post-government incomes is for the most part found to be 
unrelated to household income. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Economic insecurity has been a topic of increasing interest in academic literature over recent 
years. Though still new enough to lack a formal definition, the term is broadly used to refer to 
a state of psychological anxiety about one’s financial future. This concept has been solidified 
by authors such as Bossert and D’Ambrossio (2009), Hacker (2006) and a number of works 
by Osberg (1998, 1999, 2009, 2010), Osberg and Sharpe (2002, 2008) and Sharpe and 
Osberg (2009) who have characterized insecurity in terms of perceptions concerning future 
threats to income or wealth. Such threats typically include unemployment, illness, unexpected 
expenses, retirement, widowhood and crime as well as a range of other factors.  
While there is no great consensus within these studies on how insecurity should be measured, 
the majority of the works contend that economic insecurity has increased in recent years. For 
instance Osberg and Sharpe (2002) have found that economic security decreased in most 
OECD countries (including the U.S.) over the 1990s, while Hacker (2006) and Hacker et al. 
(2010) cite a number of examples from the U.S. reaching similar conclusions. These findings 
have been based on observations of increasing income volatility, bankruptcy rates and the 
proportion of households experiencing major economic losses. Such increases have generally 
been regarded as the flipside of policy making that has favoured work incentives and labour 
market flexibility at the expense of welfare and job security.  
If economic insecurity is high or increasing this may be legitimate cause for concern.   
Motivation comes from the belief that there are significant negative psychological effects 
associated with risks and uncertainty which should be included in an understanding of how 
personal or household finances translate into economic welfare. It is noted that the welfare 
effect of insecurity is generally regarded as a function of two components, direct disutility 
from risk, and additional psychological afflictions stemming from that risk.  The negative 
effect of financial risk is well established and depends upon the notion that households are 
constrained in their ability to smooth their consumption through time. When this applies, 
shocks to income or wealth lead to over consumption in some periods and under consumption 
in others, leading to diminished utility if households are risk averse. 
The psychological distresses associated with income risk are more difficult to study given 
that they are likely to be highly dependent on personal characteristics. Nevertheless there is 
substantial evidence of their existence. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) for instance highlight 
a cognitive bias for individuals to view losses and gains asymmetrically, with a greater 
emphasis placed on the disutility of loss than the utility of a gain. Akerlof and Kranton’s 
(2000) work on economics and identity is also important for understanding insecurity as it 
shows that there is likely to be significant social and psychological costs for an individual 
who is unable to meet certain social norms concerning employment and consumption. A 
survey based study by Luechinger et al. (2009) shows that individuals with more secure 
employment exhibit higher subjective wellbeing scores, while the links between various 
stresses and perceptions of economic risk are studied by Scheve and Slaughter (2004); 
Dominitz and Manski (1997); Rockefeller Foundation (2007); Kaiser Family Foundation 3 
 
(2009). Other empirical evidence comes from Offer et al. (2010) who highlight links between 
insecurity (in terms of probability of unemployment) and obesity. 
As economic insecurity contains a largely nebulous psychological component as well as the 
financial costs of risk, objective and comprehensive measurement is difficult. In this paper 
we simplify the problem by focussing on only one aspect of economic insecurity - income 
volatility, and ignore other sources of risk and the associated psychological costs. Although 
this glosses over certain aspects of the problem, the focus on income insecurity can be 
justified for a number of reasons. Firstly, income insecurity is closely related to job insecurity 
which is a key factor in workers’ well-being. Secondly, most households rely on their income 
to pay for daily expenses and to save for future needs including medical expenses, debt 
payment and retirement. Thirdly, many factors that cause anxiety like illness, disability and 
bankruptcy often have negative impacts on income, making it a barometer of those 
adversities. Lastly, households’ ability to borrow to meet unexpected financial need is closely 
related to their income level. Furthermore as there is a wealth of high quality income data 
available this approach allows for some tangible results. However we refer to these as 
measurements of ‘income insecurity’ rather than ‘economic insecurity’ to avoid conflating 
the concepts. While clearly imperfect, this simplification is acceptable if one is prepared to 
make the assumption that income insecurity is a reasonable proportional proxy for economic 
insecurity as a whole.  
As a study of income dynamics our method is thus related to other areas of research including 
the mobility work pioneered by Shorrocks (1978, 1981), Burkhauser and Puopore (1997), 
Canto (2000) and Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) and the work on transitory variance typified by 
Moffitt and Gottschalk (2002) and Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009).  There are however enough 
differences between income insecurity and these concepts to warrant an altogether 
independent approach.  For instance income mobility studies typically summarize income 
movements over an entire sample rather than identifying the impact upon the individual or 
household
1. Similarly the works on transitory income variance have been concerned with 
examining longitudinal trends in income fluctuations rather than looking at cross sectional 
characteristics (although the recent paper by Drewianka, 2009 is an exception).  
The angle taken in this paper is similar to that of Dynan et al. (2007) and Shin and Solon 
(2008) who study income or earnings dynamics using simple descriptive statistics. This 
approach appears to be acceptable for measuring insecurity; however there are a few 
imperfections. For instance an insecurity measure should ideally be ‘forward looking’ as it 
deals with future perceptions, however we can only measure realized volatility, and hence 
this ex post approach will ignore income risks that did not eventuate. Furthermore it is 
unclear precisely how the income volatility we observe translates into insecurity. It is likely 
for example that some income fluctuations such as from voluntary decisions to take time off 
work will not be strong drivers of insecurity, while others of equal magnitude (perhaps from 
unemployment) may have strong negative effects.  As we have no way of determining which 
                                                            
1 Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) make an explicit link between mobility and insecurity, suggesting that mobility is a 
‘Good Thing’ in that it reduces permanent income inequality, but also a ‘Bad Thing’ as it increases insecurity. 4 
 
is which, we feel the most parsimonious approach is to include (almost) all sources of 
volatility in the analysis and treat all fluctuations equivalently.  
Although these objections are reasonable it is not clear how problematic they are in practice. 
Realized income volatility is likely to make a good proxy for future insecurity, especially if 
agents form their expectations on past experience.  Secondly while it is difficult to determine 
the extent to which a single income fluctuation drives insecurity of a household, it appears 
reasonable to apply a ‘law of large numbers’ argument to income fluctuations.  Therefore 
comparisons over large samples of similar households should be valid, although comparisons 
at the individual level probably are not. 
The primary objectives of the paper are as follows. Firstly we argue that (at least for 
exploratory studies such as this one) a measure of intertemporal income inequality makes a 
reasonable ex post measure of income insecurity. Secondly, we examine cross national 
differences in average insecurity levels and differences in the influence of government. This 
allows for comparisons between several different types of market economies and of the 
effectiveness of various forms of governmental policy. Thirdly we wish to model the 
relationship between our measure of insecurity and long-run income as this may affect our 
concern for the issue.  If insecurity rises with income it may be considered to be an 
acceptable price of affluence, and hence may be seen as having a reducing effect on long run 
inequality. However if insecurity falls with income it may be that lower income earners face 
more disadvantages than previously thought. This point is especially salient if one considers 
that low income households are likely to have low savings and high liquidity constraints 
which otherwise may be used to cushion against income shocks. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II discusses the approach to measuring insecurity 
and section III previews the data.  Section IV presents some cross-national results for 
averages of the insecurity index before and after governmental taxes and transfers. Section V 
examines the relationship between income and insecurity and plots their distributions.  Lastly 
section VI summarizes the results and gives some concluding comments. 
 
II  Measuring Income Insecurity 
 
To measure insecurity we take a vector of realized incomes for each household and attempt to 
summarize the risk inherent in the observed stream.  Before deciding on the exact 
specification of the summary measure however, it is useful to establish a set of properties that 
the index should exhibit.  Certain axioms of inequality measurement appear to be useful in 
establishing properties for an ex-post insecurity index and these are reviewed in the context 
of income insecurity. There are n households and we consider household i with income 
stream	         ,    ,…      over T time periods and insecurity index      →   .  Some 
desirable properties for I would be: 5 
 
(1) Scale invariance. The measure should be insensitive to changes in the scale of the 
dependent variable.  This property makes the insecurity measure a purely proportional 
index, measuring the volatility of an income stream relative to the average of that 
stream and ensuring that, a proportional change in income (such as a 10% rise across 
all time periods) will not affect the measure.  This property is consistent with the 
argument made by Hacker (2006) that insecurity can be independent of average 
income. This property also distinguishes insecurity from the concept of ‘vulnerability’ 
(see Dercon, 2005; Bandyopadhyay and Cowell, 2007; Naude et al., 2008) which 
relates to the probability of an individual falling below a certain poverty line.   
Furthermore for a comparison of insecurity and income to be valid it is necessary that 
the definitions of income and insecurity are orthogonal.  
(2) Normalization.  It is useful to require that   0  when all incomes are equal and 
hence the insecurity index is strictly positive when there is a degree of volatility 
within the income stream.  
(3) Intertemporal transfers.  As insecurity is generally considered an increasing 
function of income volatility, a small transfer from a period of higher income to a 
period of lower income should decrease the measure, while the converse transfer 
should increase the measure. It is required that the intertemporal transfer must be 
sufficiently small such that the incomes are not reversed.  More formally if we 
consider two income streams         ,   ,     and         ,      ,        then 
                if         and            where ε is the intertemporal transfer. This 
ensures that I is an increasing function of the volatility of x.   
(4) Diminishing intertemporal transfers.  Given the asymmetry between losses and 
gains the measure should place an increasing sensitivity on periods of relative 
poverty.  For this reason a transfer of income from a period of middling income to a 
period of very low income will have a larger reduction in insecurity than a transfer 
from a period of high income to a period of middling income, and that the effect will 
diminish when the considered incomes increase. 
The first of these properties is analogous to the relativity axiom of inequality measurement 
discussed by Foster (1983), Sen (1973) and Cowell and Kuga (1981) amongst others, while 
the second is a standard feature of inequality metrics.  Similarly the property of intertemporal 
transfers is equivalent to the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle, stating that inequality is reduced 
if a small quantity of income is transferred from a higher to a lower income earner. Lastly the 
increased sensitivity of the measure to lower incomes comes from Kolm’s (1976) diminishing 
transfer principle, which requires the same higher sensitivity at the lower end of an income 
distribution of a cross sectional inequality metric.  
An index of relative inequality will therefore capture income insecurity to the degree that it is 
defined by properties 1-4. An inequality metric that has a certain appeal for this purpose is 6 
 
Atkinson’s (1970) measure
2 which has a convenient welfare interpretation. To place 
Atkinson’s index in the context of an insecurity measure suppose household i receives the 
income stream    over T time periods. If there are insufficient mechanisms in place to smooth 
the incomes stream through time, it is likely that the members of the household may prefer to 
accept some slightly lower average income if the new income level could be fixed without 
fluctuations. As this implies that volatile long run incomes are less desirable than steady 
incomes, we proceed by adjusting estimates of the permanent income of each individual to 
account for this disutility. To capture this we use the utility function   
 








x U      0             (1) 
where   is a measure of risk. Choosing a value of zero for   implies no aversion towards 
income volatility such that the household would be indifferent between any two income 
streams of the same average monetary amount, while positive values for  introduce an 
element of concavity to the utility function and a corresponding degree of aversion to income 
volatility. Once a choice for   has been made, a constant, ‘risk free’ income level is 
determined for each household that yields the same utility as income stream    This income 
represents an alternative to the original income stream and is fixed throughout time such that 
an individual earning this income level is free of the economic insecurity from income 
volatility. This income level may be calculated as 
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where   
   is referred to as the Certainty Equivalent (CE) income that provides the same 
utility as the original income stream.  
We also define a long-run income level   
∗ which is the arithmetic average of household 
incomes over the time period. The CE income will match the long-run household income 
when incomes are constant through time (i.e.	  
       
∗  if                  …    ).  If there is 
a degree of volatility through time however (e.g.          ) then the CE income will be less 
than the average level (i.e.   
       
∗), reflecting the reduction utility due to the risky nature 
of the income stream.  
                                                            
2 Osberg (1999) discusses this technique as a measure of insecurity though he expresses some reservations about 
confusing the cost of ‘risk’ with the cost of uncertainty with this method. However a number of authors have 
used this or a related method including Makdissi and Woden (2003), Cruces (2005a; 2005b; 2006), Osberg et al 
(1998) and Allanson (2008).  7 
 
From the CE income we also define a ‘risk premium’ for each household as         
∗     
  .  
This provides a measure of the burden of the risk borne by the individual in dollar terms and 
may be interpreted as the maximum amount the person is willing to pay per year to stabilize 
their income over the time period.  The greater the risk premium, the greater the volatility of 
the income stream and the greater the income insecurity faced. If    is expressed as a 
proportion of the household long-run income we arrive at a definition for Atkinson’s 
inequality index        /  
∗ which is used as our insecurity metric throughout the rest of the 
paper
3.  
A potential issue is that this approach is sensitive to macroeconomic movements such as 
economic growth or inflation which will add to nominal household income volatility.   
However if they occur proportionately it is not clear that these should contribute to insecurity 
in any meaningful sense.  To filter out these effects we rescale the incomes in each wave such 
that the mean income of all subsequent waves is set equal to the mean of the first wave. This 
eliminates any macroeconomic trends in income and renders the insecurity estimates 
insensitive to these factors. The implication of this rescaling is that measurement of insecurity 
only considers income volatility relative to the mean of the income distribution. Thus a 
business cycle that affects all households proportionally will have no influence on the 
measure; however any movement that affects relative positions within the distribution will 
still drive the index. Measuring insecurity relative to the mean of the distribution circumvents 
a difficult problem, specifically what level of nominal economic growth needs to be obtained 
in order to hold insecurity constant.  Although this ignores one potential source of insecurity 
(the average effect of the business cycle) it can be seen that this will be fairly trivial, as 
volatility in aggregate income is considerably smaller than the volatility of a particular 
household.  Indeed if occurring proportionately across the population, a recession that costs 
several percent of GDP is a relatively minor disturbance at the household level. As a result of 
this rescaling the ‘long-run’ income level  ∗ does not have the convenient interpretation as a 
permanent income level as the mean equivalizing over time has removed all economy wide 
growth in the household’s income stream. Thus the ‘long-run’ income level is slightly less 
than, but approximately proportional to the permanent income level. 
 
III.  Data 
 
Data for our analysis comes from the Cross National Equivalence File (CNEF) compiled by 
researchers at Cornell University.  This file consists of harmonized panel surveys coming 
                                                            
3 There is a further aspect to the methodology that requires justification. One may feel that time trends in income 
make an important contribution to insecurity, as an income that trends upward may feel more secure than an 
income trending downward. For this reason it is emphasized that the insecurity measure is defined only within 
the specific timeframe, and hence a period of relative poverty followed by relative affluence is no better or 
worse than a period of affluence followed by a period of poverty. 
 8 
 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the U.S., the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Similar datasets 
from other countries such as Australia, Switzerland, Canada and South Korea are also 
available. The CNEF is valuable for cross national comparisons as it draws comparable 
variables from these surveys across countries and provides constructed variables that are not 
directly available from the original sources. More information on this dataset can be found in 
Burkhauser (2001). 
For this paper we take data on household incomes for the U.S., Britain and Germany. Our 
time span is 1991-2005 for German data while British data covers 1991-2004.  This is the 
longest available time period for British data and it was considered undesirable to use 
German data that extended significantly beyond this range. Data taken from the U.S. started 
in 1991 and continues until 1997 without interruption. However the PSID changed from 
being an annual survey in 1997 to being semi-annual and hence every second wave is missing 
from this year onwards.  The final wave of the PSID data used was in 2005 and hence there 
are four waves missing relative to German data and three relative to Britain.   
In all cases we use the pre-government household income variable coded I11101XX within 
the CNEF file, and for Britain and Germany we use the post-government household income 
variable coded I11102XX. Data on U.S. post-government income was not recorded in the 
PSID after 1992 and hence we use the simulated series I11113XX created using the TAXSIM 
algorithm written by David Feenberg (Feenberg and Coutt, 1993) in its place. This program is 
designed to approximate the effect of taxes on U.S. incomes and is recommended for this 
purpose in the PSID handbook. For all three countries the pre-government income series’ 
capture the combined income of household members before tax, and the post-government 
income series measures the sum of incomes accruing to household members after taxes and 
transfers for all household members. There are a few technical differences in recording which 
can be found by consulting the relevant codebooks.   
Cross sectional surveys from each country are merged into longitudinal panels by matching 
household heads through time. As there is some evidence that national income dynamics are 
slowly evolving we follow Burkhauser and Puorpore (1997) by requiring that an income is 
recorded for each household in every wave of our sample. All other observations are dropped, 
though this still leaves 1500-2000 households in the samples for each country. The data is 
then weighted by employing the individual-level longitudinal weights assigned to each 
household head (coded W11103XX in the CNEF) to account for biases caused by attrition 
between the surveys. We also weight each household by the number of occupants and each 
income is equivalised by dividing by the square root of the household size to give an 
approximation of the total income accruing to each individual. The waves are then rescaled to 
the mean of the first wave such that any time-trends are removed
4. Negative incomes are also 
dropped although these only constitute a tiny fraction of the sample, while zero incomes are 
included. 
                                                            
4 This is performed prior to dropping households with missing observations. 9 
 
IV.  Results 
 
Atkinson’s index is applied to both pre-government and post-government income streams and 
the results are given in Table 1.  The unweighted number of households in each sample is 
given in row 1 and average long-run equivalized household incomes benchmarked at 1991 
units are provided in row 2. Insecurity estimates averaged across each sample appear in rows 
3-7. To check for robustness the results are obtained for several different cases involving 
slightly different methodologies.  These include using a range of values for α (rows 3, 4 and 
5), excluding years 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005 for all three countries as these years are 
not present in the US or British data
5 (row 6), and trimming the top and bottom 1% of 
households as ordered by income (row 7).  Insecurity estimates for trimmed data and for 
consistent time periods are determined using   0 . 5 . To preface our results in the next 
section which examine the relationship between insecurity and income we also include 
estimates of the Gini coefficient of inequality for long-run and CE incomes, and correlation 
coefficients between the insecurity index and the long-run level (rows 8-10). 
 
Table 1. Income Insecurity estimates for the United States, Germany and Britain 
 Case  United  States  Germany  Britain 
   Pre-Govt  Post-Govt  Pre-Govt Post-Govt Pre-Govt Post-Govt 
1.  n  1,995 2,000 1,741  1,743  1,575  1,587 
2.   ̅∗  28,505 22,562 19,309  15,430  10,685 9,586 
3.   ̅     0.1   0.0129 0.0060 0.0167  0.0029  0.0202  0.0047 
4.   ̅     0.3   0.0392 0.0181 0.0518  0.0087  0.0616  0.0142 
5.   ̅     0.5   0.0666 0.0301 0.0896  0.0146  0.1040  0.0241 
6.   ̅ Omitted years  0.0617 0.0272 0.0738  0.0134  0.0960  0.0219 
7.   ̅	Trimmed  0.0636 0.0290 0.0876  0.0141  0.1007  0.0237 
8.     ∗   0.3863 0.3112 0.3310  0.2183  0.3739  0.2256 
9.          0.3855 0.3056 0.3518  0.2189  0.3895  0.2263 
10  corr  , ∗   -0.1787 0.1284  -.4855 -.0793 -.4511 -.0323 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from CNEF dataset
6. 
Cross national comparisons of insecurity can be made by examining the estimates across 
various rows of the table. Taking the estimates in row 5 as a baseline we see that Britain has 
the highest level of pre-government income insecurity (a risk premium around 10.4% of 
income
7), followed by Germany (8.96%) then the U.S. (6.66%). The relative magnitudes of 
                                                            
5 All years are available in the GSOEP-CNEF data file, thus eliminating these years leaves a consistent set of 
waves for all three countries. 
6 The Gini estimates from Table 1 provide a useful check as the results are generally in line with expectations.  
The U.S. is estimated as having the highest long-run inequality, followed by Britain then Germany. This is 
consistent with many findings, the most recent of which is probably Leigh (2009). The inequality estimates are 
lower in all cases after the influence of government, and the difference between pre-government and post-
government incomes is lowest in the U.S.  
7 The magnitude of the risk premium depends upon the arbitrarily chosen value for α.  Hence the insecurity 
estimates are best interpreted relative to other estimates rather than as absolute magnitudes. 10 
 
these estimates seem reasonably insensitive to omitting years or trimming the dataset and the 
ordering is unaffected by employing different parametric weights.  For post-government 
incomes the U.S. has the highest insecurity estimate (3.01%) followed by Britain (2.41%) and 
Germany (1.46%).  Again this ordering appears robust to changes in methodology. The high 
estimates for U.S. post-government insecurity are surprising as the literature on income 
dynamics has generally shown incomes in Germany as being more mobile than in the United 
States (Burkhauser and Puopore, 1997; Maasoumi and Trede, 2001).  Recent evidence 
however has found that this difference has been closing (or even slightly reversed) in later 
years (Gangl, 2005; Chen, 2009) and thus the result appears compatible with these findings. 
Another possible factor contributing to this difference is that unlike mobility measures (such 
as Shorrocks’ ‘R’ as applied to the Gini coefficient) our measure of insecurity uses Atkinson-
type utility which is “bottom-heavy”, placing greater weighting on low income years relative 
to high income years. If the German social welfare system is more effective than the 
corresponding system in the United States at protecting households from sharp reductions in 
income (as is commonly perceived) this may explain our results as such movements are 
designed to be strong drivers of the index. 
The aggregate effect of government intervention on smoothing household incomes can be 
compared by examining the differences in insecurity between pre-government and post-
government insecurity. To do so the ratios of post-government to pre-government estimates 
are taken for each country from rows 3-7. U.S. estimates of post-government insecurity are 
from 44-47% as high as for pre-government incomes, indicating that the U.S. government 
insulates households from 53-56% of insecurity in market incomes. Similarly post-
government German insecurity levels are 16-18% as high as pre-government insecurity, and 
for Britain the corresponding figures are from 22-24%. In all cases the ratios appear 
remarkably consistent to changes in methodology and weighting parameters.  The result that 
the U.S. government does the least in insulating households from insecurity while the 
German government does the most appears consistent with general expectations about the 
differences in social welfare systems and the roles of governments between the countries. 
 
Relationships between Income and Insecurity 
 
The negative correlation coefficients between insecurity and long-run pre-government 
income (row 10) suggest that on average income insecurity is relatively high amongst low 
income earning families. This conclusion is consolidated by the evidence presented in this 
section. To show the relationship between these variables we begin by ordering the sample in 
terms of  ∗ and partition the variable to form successive mutually exclusive income groups. 
For the U.S. the income groups are constructed on the basis of 5000USD intervals, such that 
the first group contains all households with incomes ranging from 0-5000USD while the 
second group contains households with incomes from 5000-10,00USD.  For Germany the 
intervals are 4000EUR wide and intervals of 2000GBP are used for Britain.  A sufficient 11 
 
number of intervals are constructed to cover approximately the lowest earning 95% of the 
population in each case.  The upper 5% of incomes is excluded as there is a great variation in 
both income and insecurity within this segment of the population, and many income intervals 
contain zero or one observation.   
The average weighted insecurity level is then calculated for incomes within each income 
group and the results are graphed in Figures 1-38.  In each case the dashed lines correspond to 
averaged insecurity estimates from pre-government incomes and the solid lines correspond to 
estimates from post-government incomes. As the plots have been spliced together the 
horizontal axis refers to pre-government incomes when interpreting the dashed lines and post-
government incomes for the solid lines. Due to the combining of the axes it should be noted 
that a household represented at a given pre-government income level will not correspond to a 
household represented at the same post-government income.  For example a household with a 
pre-government income of 40,000USD in Figure 1 does not match with a post government 
income at the same level.  Rather this household will be represented by a point on the post-
government axis of around 30,000USD where the difference reflects the reduction in income 
due to tax.  It is for this reason that the curves depicting post-government incomes are much 
shorter than the curve depicting pre-government incomes. 
 
Figure 1. Average U.S. insecurity estimates against long run income  
 
Note: The horizontal axis gives the long-run income level in USD and the vertical axis gives the smoothed 
average insecurity level as a proportion of the horizontal axis.  The units on the horizontal axis are long-run 
equivalized pre-government incomes benchmarked at 1991 levels when interpreting the dashed line, and the 
corresponding post-government incomes for the solid line. 
 
                                                            
8 All insecurity estimates implicit in Figures 1-6 are determined using	    0.5.  Results are generally robust to 



























Figure 1 gives the relationships between long-run income and insecurity for the U.S. The 
most notable feature of the graph is the high insecurity levels for low income earning families 
and the negative relationship between the variables as income increases.  This phenomenon is 
present for both pre-government and post-government incomes but is especially strong in the 
former case.  Insecurity appears minimized for families with pre-government equivalized 
incomes from around 30,000-50,000USD (20,000-30,000USD for post government incomes) 
and there appears to be a tendency for insecurity to rise with income thereafter.  Thus in both 
cases the relationship follows a skewed and flattened ‘U’ shape.  We note that the overall 
positive correlation between income and insecurity estimates for U.S. post-government 
incomes of 0.1284 given in Table 1 is not especially evident in Figure 1.  This correlation is 
primarily driven by a very small number of extremely high income earners.  If the correlation 
is re-estimated after truncating the sample at the top 5% of income earning households as was 
done in Figure 1, this value drops to -0.043 which is in accordance with the figure. Insecurity 
can also be seen to be substantially reduced by the effect of government across the 
distribution of income.  This is especially evident at the lower end where a substantial gap 
between pre-government and post-government insecurity estimates exists, illustrating the 
extent to which the U.S. government insulates low income households. 
 
Figure 2. Average German insecurity estimates against long run income  
 
Note: The horizontal axis gives the long-run income level in EUR and the vertical axis gives the smoothed 
average insecurity level as a proportion of the horizontal axis.  The units on the horizontal axis are long-run 
equivalized pre-government incomes benchmarked at 1991 levels when interpreting the dashed line, and the 
corresponding post-government incomes for the solid line. 
Comparable results for Germany are given in Figure 2. Again there are high average 
insecurity levels for low income households and relatively low insecurity levels for families 
with middle and higher incomes.  As with the U.S. there is a strong reduction in the 
magnitudes of the estimates after governmental smoothing. Pre-government insecurity 


























particular relationship is evident. Post-government insecurity appears to decline with income 
for households with less than 10,000EUR, and seems low and uncorrelated for incomes from 
around 10,000-28,000EUR, with a slight upward trend discernable thereafter. 
 
 
Figure 3. Average British insecurity estimates against long run income  
 
Note: The horizontal axis gives the long-run income level in GBP and the vertical axis gives the smoothed 
average insecurity level as a proportion of the horizontal axis.  The units on the horizontal axis are long-run 
equivalized pre-government incomes benchmarked at 1991 levels when interpreting the dashed line, and the 
corresponding post-government incomes for the solid line. 
 
The representation for Britain in Figure 3 is broadly similar to that for the U.S. and Germany, 
with a strong but diminishing negative relationship between  ∗ and A and a notable reduction 
in insecurity for post-government incomes. One qualitative difference is that there is no sign 
of increased insecurity in either pre-government of post-government incomes after a certain 
income level
9.  
A comparison of Figures 1-3 suggests that governments in the three countries differ in the 
extent to which they smooth incomes at lower and higher levels. This can be evaluated by 
comparing the correlations between incomes and insecurity estimates before and after 
governmental smoothing (row 10). In Britain pre-government insecurity is negatively 
correlated with income (       0.4511) when evaluated over the entire distribution, but post-
government insecurity is almost uncorrelated with income (       0.0323).  The difference 
between the two correlation coefficients provides a rough guide to the extent to which 
                                                            
9 There is some evidence that insecurity is increased for the highest few percent of households in all three 


























governments are ‘progressive’ in the sense of insulating lower income households from risk 
more than higher income households.  This difference is 0.42 in Britain, 0.41 in Germany and 
0.31 in the U.S., indicating that German and British governments smooth more at the lower 
end relative to the higher end of the income distribution than in the U.S.  However market 
insecurity in the U.S. has substantially less negative correlation with income than in the other 
two countries, and as such less is left for governmental policy to remove this relationship. 
The non-negative (or slightly positive) relationship between post-government income and 
insecurity for households in the U.S. appears to be a vaguely egalitarian characteristic which 
is not present (or very weakly present for the other countries). This is evident in the Gini 
coefficients of inequality from Table 1 (rows 8-9), which compare inequality of long-run 
incomes ( ∗) with Certainty Equivalent incomes (   ).  While U.S. Gini coefficients are 
relatively high, they are slightly reduced when considering risk-adjusted income streams over 
their long-run counterparts, indicating that to some small extent, the distribution of risk 
serves as a counter-balance to inequality in the distribution of income. This is not true of 
German or British Gini coefficients, which are relatively low, but both of which increase 
when insecurity is accounted for. 
 
The Distributions of Insecurity and Long-Run Income 
 
Having established the relationships between insecurity and long-run income we now turn to 
modelling their distributions. The distribution of insecurity estimates A is of particular 
interest and to our knowledge has not been studied before in the academic literature. In all 
cases this variable appears right skewed and has a singular mode around zero with non-
negative support, and hence may be effectively modelled with an exponential distribution of 
the form: 
  
                                                                          for        ,     0                              (4) 
 
where   has the maximum likelihood estimator 1/ ̅. 
Parametric distributions are also estimated for the distribution of long-run incomes and 
Certainty Equivalent incomes. The objective is to determine the difference between the 
distribution of long-run incomes, which broadly reflect the commonly used distribution of 
permanent incomes, and the corresponding risk adjusted incomes. This is only done for pre-
government data but similar (although less exaggerated) results may also be obtained for 
post-government incomes. The distributions are modelled with the Singh-Maddala (1976) 
specification.  This three parameter model has the flexibility to fit a variety of different 
shaped distributions and has been employed for this purpose by McDonald (1995) and Stern 
(1989) amongst others.  The specification is: 15 
 
 
                                                 ∗   
   ∗   
        ∗/                for        ∗, , ,  0                (3) 
 
where parameter estimates    ,      and     are determined using an iterative maximum likelihood 
procedure.  
The left panels of Figures 4-6 show the estimated insecurity distributions for pre-government 
and post-government incomes for the three countries. Again dashed lines are used for pre-
government incomes and solid lines are used for post-government incomes. These plots 
reveal that most households are only exposed to low levels of insecurity and that higher 
levels of insecurity are increasingly uncommon.  The effect of government taxes and transfers 
can be seen to strongly increase the frequency of low insecurity households for all three 
countries, albeit by varying amounts.   
The right panels show the distributions of pre-government income before and after insecurity 
has been accounted for. In this case the dashed line is still used for pre-government incomes 
however the solid line now represents Certainty Equivalent pre-government incomes. While 
the distributions are not greatly different overall it is evident that the relative frequency of 
low income earners is increased, however the distributions appear largely unchanged in the 
upper tails. This result is reasonably consistent over the three countries; however the effect 
appears most prominent in Britain.  
 
Figure 4. U.S. pre-government and post-government insecurity distributions (A; left panel) and pre-
government income distributions (x*, x
CE; right panel) 
    
Note: For the left panel the dashed line gives the distribution of insecurity for pre-government incomes while the 
solid line gives the distribution for post-government incomes. Parameter estimates for the distributions are 
     1 5 . 0 2  and       33.22 respectively. The right panel gives the pre-government income distributions for x* 
(long run incomes, USD, dashed line) and x
CE  (certainty equivalent incomes, USD, solid line). Parameter 
estimates for the distribution of x* are       1.785 ,       44712  and       2.625 while for x
CE they are       1.602 























































Figure 5. Germany pre-government and post-government insecurity distributions (A; left panel) and pre-
government income distributions (x*, x
CE; right panel) 
   
Note: For the left panel the dashed line gives the distribution of insecurity for pre-government incomes while the 
solid line gives the distribution for post-government incomes. Parameter estimates for the distributions are 
     1 1 . 1 6  and       64.89 respectively. The right panel gives the pre-government income distributions for x* 
(long run incomes, EUR, dashed line) and x
CE  (certainty equivalent incomes, EUR, solid line). Parameter 
estimates for the distribution of x*  are        1.624 ,       124047  and       18.215 while for x
CE  they are 
      1.4268 ,       1026323  and       275.59. 
 
Figure 6. Britain pre-government and post-government insecurity distributions (A; left panel) and pre-
government income distributions (x*, x
CE; right panel) 
   
Note: For the left panel the dashed line gives the distribution of insecurity for pre-government incomes while the 
solid line gives the distribution for post-government incomes. Parameter estimates for the distributions are 
     9 . 6 2  and      4 1 . 4 9  respectively. The right panel gives the pre-government income distributions for x* 
(long run incomes, GBP, dashed line) and x






































































































estimates for the distribution of x* are       1.340 ,       290239 and       76.204 while for x
CE they are     
1.201 ,       1384247  and       344.6. 
 
A number of welfare implications can be drawn from the above findings. Firstly low-income 
households are disproportionally burdened by income insecurity compared to their more 
affluent counterparts. This implies that income level based measures such as poverty, 
deprivation and vulnerability indicators may not fully capture the economic hardship 
experienced by low-income groups.  Secondly, government taxes and transfers can be very 
effective in mitigating income insecurity and thus in improving welfare. However, the 
differences in the results between the U.S. on the one side and Germany and Britain on the 
other side indicate that there remain large variations in the effectiveness of government 
policies in income smoothing, pending on the design of the tax and welfare systems. Thirdly, 
despite the fact that insecurity mostly pounds on low-income groups, surprisingly its 
inclusion does not have much materialistic impacts on the Gini coefficient measure of income 
inequality. Taken at face value this suggests that at the aggregate level, insecurity is more 
important in determining the level of welfare than in its distribution. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
The paper has argued that an intertemporal application of Atkinson’s inequality metric makes 
a reasonable ex post measure of income insecurity, which in turn is an important component 
of economic insecurity. The technique is applied to household ranging from 1991 to 2005 for 
the United States, Germany and Britain and some similarities and differences between the 
countries are discussed. 
To briefly summarize our results, we find that of the three countries insecurity in pre-
government incomes is highest in Britain and lowest in the United States.  Conversely 
insecurity in post-government incomes is highest in the United States and lowest in Germany.  
Accordingly the U.S. government appears to reduce insecurity less than the other two 
governments. Furthermore we find that insecurity in market incomes are strongly negatively 
correlated with income in all three countries, however insecurity in post-government incomes 
is largely uncorrelated with income. This suggests that governments are quite progressive in 
the manner in which they shelter lower income earning households more than higher income 
households from income insecurity. There are some cross national differences in the extent 
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